The company tables separate resolutions at general meetings of shareholders on each substantially separate issue unless the issues are interdependent and linked so as to form one significant proposal. Where the resolutions are “bundled”, the company explains the reasons and material implications in the notice of meeting.
A. Explanation

This Provision describes the use of resolutions at general meetings.

The input and decisions of shareholders at general meetings are usually conducted through resolutions, or proposals that are submitted for a vote. A resolution can be ordinary (requires a simple majority to pass), special (a three-quarter majority to pass), or advisory (non-binding on directors and the company).

Once a resolution is passed, the directors and the company are obliged to implement it, except for an advisory resolution.

A resolution should relate to a discrete item. It should not be bundled with other resolutions unless they are truly interdependent. For example, in the election of Board members, each Board member should be represented by a separate resolution because Board members are appointed in their individual capacities and not as a team.

When resolutions are bundled, they effectively prevent shareholders from making different decisions on the individual parts. This could result in the perception that the company is attempting to unfairly push an unfavourable agenda.

In general, resolutions should not be bundled or made inter-conditional on each other. This is to ensure that shareholders are given the right to express their views and exercise their voting rights on each resolution separately. However, in situations where resolutions have to be inter-conditional, such as in meetings to approve a reverse takeover, the company should clearly explain the reasons for, and key implications of, bundling them.


B. Practice Guidance


C. Related Rules and Regulations
  • Nil.

D. CG Guides
  • Board Guide Appendix 7F: General Meetings of Shareholders [Stakeholder Engagement].


E. Related Articles
  • Nil.



eGuide to CG Code
Definition of Corporate Governance
History and Structure of the Code
Role of the Board
Role of the Chair
Focus on Long Term and Sustainability
Revised Code Structure and Approach
Mandatory Principles
Provisions and Variations
Thoughtful and Meaningful Application
Board Matters
Principle 1
Provision 1.1
Provision 1.2
Provision 1.3
Provision 1.4
Provision 1.5
Provision 1.6
Provision 1.7
Principle 2
Provision 2.1
Provision 2.2
Provision 2.3
Provision 2.4
Provision 2.5
Principle 3
Provision 3.1
Provision 3.2
Provision 3.3
Principle 4
Provision 4.1
Provision 4.2
Provision 4.3
Provision 4.4
Provision 4.5
Principle 5
Provision 5.1
Provision 5.2
Provision 5.3
Remuneration Matters
Principle 6
Provision 6.1
Provision 6.2
Provision 6.3
Provision 6.4
Principle 7
Provision 7.1
Provision 7.2
Provision 7.3
Principle 8
Provision 8.1
Provision 8.2
Provision 8.3
Accountability and Audit
Principle 9
Provision 9.1
Provision 9.2
Principle 10
Provision 10.1
Provision 10.2
Provision 10.3
Provision 10.4
Provision 10.5
Shareholder Rights and Responsibilities
Principle 11
Provision 11.1
Provision 11.2
Provision 11.3
Provision 11.4
Provision 11.5
Provision 11.6
Principle 12
Provision 12.1
Provision 12.2
Provision 12.3
Managing Stakeholder Relationships
Principle 13
Provision 13.1
Provision 13.2
Provision 13.3
Practice Guidance
Board Roles and Director Duties
Board Composition and Guidance
Chairman and CEO
Board Membership
Board Performance
Procedures for Developing Remuneration Policies
Level and Mix of Remuneration
Disclosure on Remuneration
Risk Management and Internal Controls
Audit Committee
Shareholder Rights and Engagement
Engagement with Shareholders
Managing Stakeholder Relationships
eGuide Glossary

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